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Improper risk financing solutions for market losses may withhold farmers to punctually 
participate during an epidemic in so-called “vaccination-to-live strategies.” This paper 
shows that although market losses are not straightforward to insure, loss parameters can be 
assessed. It also demonstrates that recently introduced EU subsidies can act as a catalyst for 
agriculture-related risks that are difficult to insure, thereby promoting more efficient 
eradication strategies, including “vaccination-to-live.” Findings of this paper are useful for 
policy makers and chain actors to jointly design risk-sharing solutions for market losses. 
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Public concerns over destroying large amounts of animals spurred policy makers to adopt 
so-called “vaccination-to-live” strategies to control future outbreaks of livestock epidemics 
(Hop et al., 2012). This strategy, also known as protective vaccination, includes destruction of 
infected and contact herds coupled with simultaneous vaccination of susceptible herds within 
a certain radius. Under this strategy, products from vaccinated animals are not destroyed, but 
marketed “as usual” (European Commission, 2003). In the Netherlands, contingency plans 
foresee protective vaccination for future outbreaks of classical swine fever (CSF) and foot and 
mouth disease (FMD). Yet after nearly ten years of debates, the question of selling products 
from vaccinated animals remains unresolved, with policy makers recently associating market 
losses from vaccination with entrepreneurial risk. Nevertheless, public-private solutions to 
finance these losses may be needed for farmers not to frustrate vaccination programs. Similar 
arguments have been put forth to find public-private financing solutions for direct losses 
(Meuwissen et al., 2003a). 
Market losses can result from supply and demand distortions arising from special heat 
treatments applied to meat stemming from vaccinated animals. They can also result from 
consumer concerns over the safety of products from vaccinated animals. Market disruptions 
are expected for non-vaccinated regions, as well, though little is known about the size of 
market losses under protective vaccination regimes. In epidemics where stamping-out or 
suppressive vaccination strategies
 
were deployed, market losses were only described in 
qualitative terms.  
For instance, Vrolijk and Poppe (2008) state that in November 1988, about six months 
after the end of the CSF-epidemic, “prices came at the lowest levels after the Second World 
War Market”. Huirne et al. (2002) estimated that more than half of the FMD farm-level losses 
arriving from business interruption came after the epidemic ended. With regard to AI, Mourits 
et al. (2008) state that substantial income losses were incurred by multiple partners of the 
supply chain.  
The limited information about the size of risk and the catastrophic nature of market losses 
hinder the design of a viable public-private risk financing solution. In this context, this paper 
aims to discuss the insurability of market losses in general, to elicit expert judgments on the 
expected size of market losses, and to review the experience of re-allocating EU subsidies to 
facilitate insurance uptake for catastrophic risks in agriculture.  
The insurability of market losses is assessed along the set of idealised conditions from the 
viewpoint of the insurer (Rejda, 1998). For reasons of completeness also the already covered 
direct losses are included as well as business interruption losses. For the latter, for some 
sectors and in some member states private insurance already exists (Van Asseldonk et al., 
2006).
1
 With regard to the to date experience of using EU premium subsidies for catastrophic 
insurance, assessments focus on the Netherlands and address extreme weather as well as 
disease insurance. 
Insurability of epidemic disease losses 
Before a risk can be financed with a pooling system, certain basic requirements must be 
fulfilled (Rejda, 1998). Each item is addressed below, both in a general context as well as 
with a focus on the various damage components of livestock epidemics (Table 1). Not all 
idealised conditions hold for the various loss components, with problems arising due to the 
number conditions. Yet this does not mean that a pooling system is impossible, since the 
                                                     
1
. In the Netherlands, pig farmers could insure business interruption damage from CSF and FMD 
outbreaks  through a mutual (founded in 2002). In 2012, the mutual was discontinued due to lack 
of interest (Meuwissen et al., 2013). 
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problems can be partially overcome with a sound design of the risk sharing tool, as discussed 
below.  
Table 1. Extent to which loss components of livestock epidemics  
in a protective vaccination framework fulfil risk pooling requirements 
 
Veterinary 
losses 
Business  
interruption 
Market 
losses 
There must be a large number 
of exposure units 
++ ++ ++ 
The loss must be accidental 
and unintentional 
+ + - 
The loss must be determinable 
and measurable 
+ + -- 
The loss should not be 
catastrophic 
- + -- 
The probability of loss must be 
calculable 
+ + - 
The rates must be 
economically feasible 
+ ++ - 
Scale applied:  -- = requirement violated; - = requirement somewhat violated; + = requirement somewhat 
fulfilled; ++ = requirement fulfilled. 
Large number of exposure units. Ideally, there should be a large group of roughly similar 
(but not necessarily identical) exposure units that are subject to the same peril or group of 
perils. The loss can then be spread over all participants in the underwriting class (Rejda, 
1998). Although the susceptibility for a specific disease agent differs across types of livestock 
production, these discrepancies can be easily addressed by setting up specific pools, or 
through premium differentiation. Additional risk-determining factors include the animal and 
herd densities, the incidence of wildlife that may be carriers, and the proximity of airports and 
seaports as sources of infection. The expected size of epidemics varies across areas, as well, 
depending largely on animal and herd densities. Differentiating premiums according to the 
location of a farm is likely to increase interest in insurance among farmers from outside 
hazard-prone areas, thereby giving the insurer potential for risk spreading.  
Accidental and unintentional loss. In an ideal situation, the loss would be fortuitous and 
outside the participant’s control, thereby preventing moral hazard (Rejda, 1998). With moral 
hazard, exposure units change their behaviour in a manner not predicted by the owner of the 
system after signing the contract — for example, by becoming more careless (Arrow, 1996).  
A livestock farmer can influence the expected probability of the herd becoming infected. 
Factors that influence this probability include the sanitary barriers and hygiene on the farm, 
the number of animal contacts and whether stock is purchased from sources with known 
health status or from markets and dealers. A farmer’s influence on the size of risk is likely to 
cause problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in an insurance scheme. Adverse 
selection can be minimized by differentiating premiums according to measurable risk factors. 
Moral hazard can be minimized with contract specifications on “due diligence” and with 
deductibles. Moreover, establishing an appropriate legal framework covering epidemic fraud 
(with appropriate penalties) reduces incentives to be dishonest.  
Governments can also influence losses through the control strategies they deploy. 
Governments decide on — and are held responsible for — the control measures taken during 
an epidemic. Relatively extensive movement standstills and elaborate protective vaccination 
programs are effective strategies to eradicate an epidemic. Veterinary costs decrease at the 
expense of market losses. Therefore, transparent and systematically-applied control measures 
4 – EUROPEAN UNION SUBSIDIES AS CATALYST FOR EPIDEMIC DISEASE MARKET LOSS INSURANCE? 
 
 
 
 
LIVESTOCK DISEASE POLICIES: BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ECONOMIES © OECD 2013 
are necessary. Governments and insurers must also reach agreements about the control 
strategies to be applied under various circumstances in order to avoid debates on this issue 
during an epidemic. 
Determinable and measurable loss. “Determinable” means that the amount of loss can be 
limited and clearly expressed if a certain expense is within the defined loss. “Measurable” 
means that the loss is financial and that its amount can be determined, either through 
calculation or estimation. Compensation of the veterinary costs can be based either on a pre-
set animal value or actual market value at the moment of culling. The indemnity for business 
interruption losses should be based on the actual incurred loss or a proxy of the loss (for 
example, indemnity could be based on duration times average gross margin). Quantifying 
market losses a priori is fairly cumbersome and can be problematic, since there are hardly any 
claim experiences available. Linking expert elicitations to simulation studies, as described by 
Longworth et al. (2012a, b), seems useful in this respect. 
Not catastrophic. In order to make the pooling technique workable, a large proportion of 
the exposure units must not incur losses at the same time. With systemic or correlated risks, 
multiple participants can suffer losses at the same time (Skees and Barnett, 1999). Livestock 
epidemics generally involve many farms at the same time, and a massive protective 
vaccination program only amplifies this problem. Problems arise with respect to pooling 
within a year, as adequate reinsurance capacity is not typically available when the scale of 
systemic risk is large (Jaffee and Russell, 1997; Miranda and Glauber, 1997). The capital 
market is also not well acquainted with epidemic disease risks. Losses resulting from a 
decrease in product market value are therefore difficult to transfer. Limited subsidies may be 
justified in order to encourage private markets to design risk-sharing solutions (Arrow, 1996; 
Meuwissen et al., 2003b). In the European Union, such subsidies have been available since 
2009, as discussed below.  
Calculation of probability of loss. To set an appropriate rate, one must accurately 
calculate the cumulative distribution function of both the frequency and severity of losses 
(Rejda, 1998). Historical data on disease outbreaks and associated damage figures are too 
scarce to derive the cumulative distribution function, and may not be fully relevant if, for 
instance, the control measures have changed. Historical data on the probability of protective 
vaccination being applied, and the circumstances under which this would happen, remain 
scarce. Nevertheless, risk models estimating the impact of outbreak scenarios can be helpful. 
Feasible rates. The farmer must be willing to pay the rate, but research shows that people 
typically have problems in assessing the probability and potential magnitude of such risks 
(Kunreuther, 1976). Because of such cognitive failure, farmers’ willingness to pay for 
insurance is less than the actual premium required (Skees and Barnett, 1999). However, there 
are business interruption coverages that compensate farmers at times of an outbreak (Van 
Asseldonk et al., 2006). In this context, effective risk communication remains crucial. 
Elicited size of market losses 
Expert judgments on the size of market losses originate from 2004. During that time, 
i.e. in the aftermath of the 1997/98-CSF, 2001-FMD and 2003-AI epidemics, policy makers 
and chain actors were jointly assessing the expected impact of protective vaccination. Expert 
panels were interviewed sector-wise, i.e. one panel for the pig sector, one for the dairy sector 
and one for the beef, veal, sheep and goat sector. Experts were from private companies as well 
as from public organizations. Groups ranged from 4 (dairy panel) to ten experts (pig panel). 
As a point of reference, participants were first presented with price data from the 2001 FMD 
epidemic during which suppressive vaccination was applied. They were then asked to 
estimate aggregate market loss percentages, i.e. we did not ask experts to differentiate 
between various market loss items, chain participants, or time frames. Percentages were 
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assessed in an FMD context and specified with regard to farm-gate price levels (only for dairy 
and white veal, factory-gate and slaughterhouse-gate prices were used respectively). 
Table 2 shows the results of the expert elicitations. For vaccinated animals, expected 
market losses are especially high for pork, including piglets and hogs, and some white veal, 
including an expected price decline of 75% and 80%, respectively. With regard to pigs and 
hogs, the Netherlands, as a net exporter, is expected to see severe supply and delivery 
problems, and would incur high costs of temporarily storing large amounts of labelled meat. 
High loss percentages for veal mainly arise from the necessity to sell meat without bones after 
vaccination; normally, 80% of white veal is sold with bones. Similar arguments apply for 
marbled veal, as well as meat from sheep and goats. For the percentage of meat already 
deboned under normal circumstances, prices are mostly expected to decline to world market 
levels for matured meat from vaccinated animals (which is 35% below normal market prices). 
With respect to dairy, experts expect lost markets to be reflected by a price decline of about 
10% of the default price. (However, in the event of a large epidemic with extensive 
vaccination zones, they expect prices to even decrease by 20%. 
Table 2. Elicited market loss parameters for protective vaccination in the Netherlands1 
 
Default 
price2 
Vaccinated animals 
(8 months)3 
Other animals in 
affected region  
(length of epidemic)3 
Animals in 
non-affected regions 
(8 months)3, 4 
  
Production 
affected 
(%) 
Price 
impact 
(%) 
Production 
affected (%) 
Price 
impact 
(%) 
Production 
affected 
(%) 
Price 
impact  
(%) 
Dairy5 0.57/kg 100 -10 100 -10 80/20 -8/-15 
Beef 2.50/kg 100 -35 100 -5 15 -5 
Piglets (25 kg) 
41.50/ 
piglet 
100 -75 100 -20 100 -15 
Hogs (110 kg) 1.27/kg 100 -75 100 -20 100 -15 
Marbled veal6 2.62/kg 80/20 -60/-35 100 -10 15 -5 
White veal6 5.65/kg 80/20 -80/-55 100 -65 100 -25 
Sheep & goat6 2.25/kg 80/20 -60/-35 100 -15 15 -5 
1. Protective vaccination includes destruction of infected herds, limited pre-emptive culling of contact herds, and 
emergency vaccination of all susceptible herds in a 2-km zone around infected herds. Vaccinated animals and their 
products are marketed. Estimations are for foot and mouth disease epidemics in the Netherlands. 
2. Farm-gate prices. Only for dairy and white veal other prices are used, i.e. factory-gate and slaughterhouse-gate 
prices respectively. 
3. Period during which market losses occur.  
4. Includes non-vaccinated animals from affected region from end of epidemic until abandoning of restrictions at the 
national level (8 months). 
5.
 
The 80/20 difference relates to percentage of produce normally delivered to Dutch and EU markets (80%) and other 
markets (20%). 
6. The 80/20 difference relates to percentage of produce normally not deboned (80%) and deboned (20%). 
Elicited loss percentages in the other columns of Table 2 — for non-vaccinated animals in 
affected regions and for animals in non-affected regions — are generally much lower, though 
substantial losses are expected in some sectors. For instance, experts from the pig sector 
expect that 100% of piglets and hogs in non-affected regions would face lower prices, for the 
same reasons as mentioned above. Dairy experts also expect considerable losses in non-
affected regions, as the percentage of dairy products normally exported to third countries 
(20% and, in this case, outside the European Union) is supposed to face severe problems due 
to decreased demand. In general, all sectors in non-affected regions are believed to face 
market losses. Experts do not believe these regions would benefit from the occurrence of an 
epidemic, as was temporarily the case during the 1997/98 CSF epidemic in the Netherlands. 
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EU premium subsidies for agricultural insurance 
After many years of debates among opponents and proponents of EU support for 
agricultural insurance, Article 68 of EC 73/2009 opened the pathway for EU contributions to 
insurance schemes (European Commission, 2009). More specifically, the regulation supports 
premiums for weather and disease insurance. It is also possible to receive support for setting 
up mutual funds, and for the compensation paid by such funds to farmers for losses suffered. 
Approval of Dutch and EU governments is required to obtain support. A 30% deductible must 
also be implemented, and subsidies are to be paid directly to involved farmers.  
So far, insurers in the Netherlands have applied for the premium subsidies rather than the 
other types of support available. Moreover, it has been mutuals (not commercial insurers) who 
have actually applied for premium subsidies (Meuwissen et al., 2013). As shown in Table 3, 
these mutuals cover greenhouse and field crops, fruits, and breeding and rearing stages of the 
broiler chain. (Although the European Union had already approved broiler insurance and 
support, the price risk coverage was ultimately not provided by the broilers mutual, as 
members could not agree on the exact scope of the insurance — e.g. whether it should apply 
exclusively to farmers in restriction zones or to the Netherlands as a whole.)  
Lack of commercial interest may arise from uncertainty surrounding the subsidies. After 
CAP reforms, they are likely to move from Pillar 1 (production support) to Pillar 2 (rural 
development), and it is not entirely certain what the impact of this transfer will be.  
Table 3. Insurance schemes in the Netherlands using EU premium subsidies1 
Insured  
commodities 
Perils to which  
subsidy applies 
Premium subsidies  
since 
Greenhouse and field crops Multi-peril weather risks 2010 
Fruits Multi-peril weather risks 2010 
Broilers (breeding and rearing)  Market losses AI epidemics (2012)2 
1. Premiums are subsidised up to 65%. Support originates from EU (75%) and Dutch (25%) governments.  
2. Subsidy for AI-losses was approved in 2012, but coverage was finally not provided by the mutual.  
Discussion and conclusions 
Designing insurance solutions for market losses is a challenge plagued by uncertainties. 
Will protective vaccination actually be applied? How will the market respond? From a risk 
management perspective, it is important to find solutions in order to provide farmers with the 
necessary incentives to punctually participate in vaccination programs.  
This paper illustrated that market losses are not easy to insure, as they do not fulfil all 
conditions of an insurable risk. The size of the risk and its catastrophic nature are especially 
problematic. At the same time, we demonstrated that insight into the potential size of losses 
can be obtained, and that EU subsidies recently became available to facilitate the design of 
schemes. Loss assessments show that market losses can be substantial for pigs and white veal 
calves, in particular. Although figures originate from 2004, marketing channels have 
remained fairly unchanged since then.  
Results are useful in bringing policy makers and chain actors together once again. The 
2009 introduction of EU subsidies is expected to enhance and accelerate this process, since, as 
the broiler mutual demonstrated, price impacts of livestock epidemics are eligible for 
subsidies. However, experience in the Netherlands also demonstrated that EU subsidies for 
agricultural insurance are not yet widely applied. They could be steered by the relative 
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newness of the subsidies, and the uncertainty about CAP reforms and the related repositioning 
of insurance subsidies.  
If chain actors and policy makers want to make progress in developing insurance for 
market losses, “peace time” seems to be the best time to do so. This paper clearly identifies 
major difficulties, the sectors that should be prioritised, and the role that subsidies could play 
as a catalyst for difficult-to-insure risks in agriculture.  
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